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Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancien
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Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. x, 229. $16.50.
Reviewed by Mirjan Dama~kat
I
Torture and the criminal law have a long and ignominious associa-
tion that continues to the present day. In his short book, poised grace-
fully between simplicity and learning, John Langbein discusses only
one of the many forms of this association. He is concerned with torture
as a legally permissible technique of obtaining evidence from the de-
fendant in the course of judicial interrogation. In a further narrowing
of focus, the author approaches judicial torture as a student of the
law of evidence. He centers on the relationship of torture to standards
of proof sufficiency. His main purpose is to propose a novel thesis
about the abolition of judicial torture on the continent of Europe.
The story begins with the collapse of the early medieval vision of
reality, which assumed a continuing interpenetration of the human
world and the world of the deity. This conception of reality was re-
flected in the magical modes of proof predicated on the assumption of
divine intervention in legal proceedings. When this operative assump-
tion became problematic, sacred legitimation of judgments had to be
replaced by a secular one. One answer to this problem developed in the
Roman-canon procedure, where judges, no longer able to consult the
deity, began to interrogate persons likely to possess information about
crimes. But, says Langbein, the subjective beliefs of terrestrial judges as
to what evidence was sufficient to support a judgment could not be
accepted in the afterglow of a world where court decisions were legiti-
mated by divine intervention-especially when serious crime was in-
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volved for which the "blood sanction" of capital punishment or maim-
ing had come to be regarded as the normal sanction.
To solve this legitimation problem, judges were required to evaluate
evidence according to legal rules, so that a system of legal proof came
into existence. The prescribed standard of proof sufficiency was very
demanding. Conviction of serious crime required either the testimony
of two unimpeachable eyewitnesses or the defendant's confession be-
fore the judge. The required witnesses were seldom available, and, in
view of the draconian punishments, voluntary confessions were also in
short supply. In consequence, the Roman-canon system turned to the
practice of coercing confessions. Langbein is cautious enough to avoid
suggesting that judicial torture would not have appeared but for the
demanding proof-sufficiency standard. He maintains, however, that
once this standard was adopted, it inevitably led to judicial torture.
In pausing briefly to consider whether judicial torture was ineffi-
cient in terms of screening the guilty from the innocent, Langbein
displays, I think, good sense in avoiding the well-motivated but unin-
formed opinion that would dismiss torture on an epistemological plane
as an irrational institution pure and simple. He points out that the
defendant could not legally be subjected to torture in the absence of
cogent incriminating evidence and suggests that most legally prescribed
evidentiary prerequisites to torture were so stringent that many a mod-
em judge would convict on such interim proof alone.' In addition, he
identifies a number of measures, such as the requirement of verifica-
tion, designed to avoid convictions on false confessions. Continuing
with his focus on epistemological issues alone, he then discusses the
important defects in the safeguards designed to prevent the condemna-
tion of an innocent man. 2 Most of these, he points out, were known at
the time but were accepted as a necessary price for the operation of
a system that relied on a demanding law of proof.
1. See J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 8-9 (1977) [hereinafter cited by
page number only]. On the results of archival studies leading to the same conclusion, see 1
H. KANTOROWicz, ALBERTUS GANDINUS UND DAS STRAFRECHT DER SCHOLASTIK: DIE PRAXIS 134
(1897). The fact that even today many agencies continue to extract information by force
should make us cautious about subscribing too readily to the view that torture is "irra-
tional." For these agencies do not so much lack mcans-ends efficiency as they do humanity.
2. In discussing these defects, Langbein blames the slipshod determination of the
corpus delicti for the massive execution of witches on the Continent. There was, he says,
no "objective proof" of the commission of the crime. See pp. 9, 14. I think that more
cognitive empathy is needed here. The law of evidence cannot be separated from the
substantive criminal law and the world view of a period. If dangerous magic is part of
social reality in a culture, its law of evidence cannot help but establish the existence of
magic. What proof is "objective" is not independent of the world view. There were other
defects of the inquisitorial system that can, I think, more properly be blamed for having
facilitated massive convictions for witchcraft.
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Notwithstanding the preference for an objective proof standard, Ro-
man-canon law did not totally eliminate the subjective evaluation of
evidence by the judge. It survived, says Langbein, in two areas. In in-
vestigations of serious crime, the sufficiency of evidence for the inter-
locutory decision to impose torture rested ultimately on free judicial
evaluation of evidence. Although the law attempted to regulate this
evidentiary problem as well, circumstantial evidence sufficed for the
interim decision, and such evidence depends on subjective evaluation
for its efficacy. More openly, free evaluation survived in the case of
petty crime, where torture was prohibited and circumstantial evidence
could support a conviction.
Created in the thirteenth century, this evidentiary system continued,
basically unchanged, for three hundred years. Having thus far mainly
followed traditional scholarship, Langbein now leaves the ground trod-
den by conventional teaching altogether. His new approach to the
problem of torture begins with penological history. In the late Middle
Ages, death and maiming were thought to be proper punishments for
all serious crime. But in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, these afflictive punishments went into decline for a con-
geries of reasons. Various forms of penal servitude came into use and
were responsible for the eclipse of the old "blood sanction." 3 It is dur-
ing this period, Langbein argues, that a covert but important change
occurred in the Continental law of evidence.
Courts suddenly began to hold that the demanding Roman-canon
standard of proof for serious crime applied only when the imposition
of the harsh, old punishments was contemplated. The new and milder
punishments (poenae extraordinariae) could be imposed for serious
crime on the less stringent standard of proof that had applied from
the inception of the system to less serious offenses. In Langbein's
theory, the consequences of this evidentiary change were formidable
and far-reaching. Under the old r~gime, he tells us, defendants accused
of serious crime had to be acquitted in the absence of full proof, which
in practice meant the absence of in-court confessions. Acquittal was
imperative no matter how much the judge happened to be persuaded
that the defendant was guilty. The milder punishments opened up a
via media. When judges could not gather full legal proof (for example,
because a defendant withstood torture without confessing), but were
subjectively persuaded that the defendant was actually guilty, the
3. See pp. 43-44. Attempts have been made elsewhere to attribute the penological
changes primarily to the decline of feudalism and the great economic transformations
of the period. See E. BLOCH, NATURRECHT UND MENCHLICHE WORDE 277-79 (1961).
Vol. 87: 860, 1978
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judges were no longer forced to acquit. Henceforth they could convict
and sentence the defendant, albeit to a milder punishment.
Obviously, then, the defendant's confession ceased to be a practical
prerequisite for conviction in most cases of serious crime. With this
reliance on confessions gone, judicial torture lost its raison d'etre. As
a technique for gathering evidence, it had become otiose already in
the seventeenth century and in many places had been transmuted into
a form of punishment. As torture became useless, denatured, or both,
the Roman-canon system of legal proof lost its practical importance
too. It continued to live, says Langbein, mainly as law on the books,
deprived of vitality, a delayed mortal spasm of the Middle Ages.
The abandonment of judicial torture on the Continent, argues
Langbein, was therefore essentially an internal, "juristic" event. It
was primarily a consequence of an "evidentiary revolution," perpe-
trated covertly under the guise of milder forms of punishment. This
"revolution" ushered in the era of free evaluation of evidence and
must be viewed as the proper starting point for all accounts of the
abolition of torture. Moderating some stronger claims at the beginning
of his book, Langbein concedes that factors outside the legal system
have some force in explaining the abolition of torture. But, unlike
traditional scholarship, his account downplays the importance of the
Enlightenment propaganda against torture. The philosophes and other
publicists are even castigated for the inefficiency of their efforts. They
harped on old criticisms of torture, says Langbein, mainly trying to
create a sense of moral outrage against the continuing use of legally
permissible judicial brutality. But they failed to advance the decisive
argument. They should have pointed out to Enlightenment mon-
archs and public opinion (where it existed) that, after the evidentiary
changes, criminals could be convicted on less than full proof, so that
criminal procedure was free from its reliance on confessions and the
coercive means of inducing them.4
Langbein's central thesis deviates in most important respects from
conventional accounts of the abolition of torture. These accounts the
author dismisses in a somewhat parodistic sketch as a fairy tale.,; While
the orthodoxy is silent on the matter, in Langbein one finds for the
first time the idea that the need for judicial torture did not continue
unabated until the eighteenth century. It is, I think, his formidable
4. P. 67.
5. See pp. 10-11, 64-69. The author attributes to the orthodoxy his own understanding
of the essence of legal proof, and by accomplishing this switch, he makes the conventional
account appear slightly ridiculous.
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achievement to have demonstrated how the adoption of milder forms
of punishment based on less than full proof affected the need for co-
erced confessions, thereby changing the role of judicial torture and
paving the way for its abolition. Conventional teaching has recognized
the intimate relationship between the Roman-canon law of proof and
judicial torture at the beginning, in the thirteenth century, but has
held that torture and Roman-canon proof died separate deaths: torture
met its Nemesis in the eighteenth century, while legal proof continued
to live until the middle of the nineteenth. Langbein's thesis re-estab-
lishes the symmetry in their terminal phases. Not only were legal proof
and judicial torture born together, but they were also both fatally
wounded before the eighteenth century in the evidentiary revolution.
After judicial torture had been abolished, legal proof continued to
live only a phantom life in nearly abandoned statutes. In practice free
evaluation of evidence already reigned supreme, although the pro-
cedural system was for a while sailing under the false colors of legal
proof.
To this basic theme Langbein adds a counterpoint-the English ex-
perience. In England the judgment of God was replaced by the judg-
ment of representatives of the local community. Why did this alterna-
tive system remain free of judicial torture throughout the late Middle
Ages? Surely it was not because English society of the period was more
humane and enlightened than Continental societies. Following Mait-
land, Langbein argues that the English were simply "beneficiaries of
legal institutions so crude that torture was unnecessary."" Before the
sixteenth century, when the jury was transformed from a body of both
witnesses and triers into a panel of adjudicators, the law of evidence
did not develop even minimal standards for the sufficiency of evidence,
let alone standards so demanding that judicial torture would become,
as on the Continent, a practical necessity. To this day, Langbein states,
an English jury can convict on less evidence than was required on
the Continent as a mere precondition for putting a defendant to
torture.7
Although not necessary, judicial torture could still have developed
in the sixteenth century as a useful device to help justices of the peace
6. P. 77.
7. Pp. 9, 149 n.30. Langbein assimilates the Scottish jury to his treatment of its English
counterpart. See p. 149 n.29 . But the Scottish jury seems still to operate under a variant
of the legal proof system. See A. SHEEHAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND AND FRANCE
121, 161 (1975). If the needs of "corroboration" introduced by the negative legal proof
system created proof difficulties, there may have been greater pressures to judicial torture
in Scotland than in England. See I. WiLLocK, THE ORIcINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY
IN SCOTLAND 200 (1966).
Vol. 87: 860, 1978
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in obtaining confessions from suspects and thus in gaining guilty ver-
dicts. Apparently, however, torture for interrogative purposes was le-
gitimate in England only for a brief period during the reign of the
Tudors and Stuarts and was limited to the practice of a central gov-
ernmental agency-the Privy Council." Discarding here his focus on
the interdependence of proof standards and judicial torture, Langbein
tries to explain this phenomenon by arguing that, while judicial tor-
ture presupposes a bureaucratized judiciary, there was no such judi-
ciary in England during the period." In short, England remained free
from judicial torture because it did not develop a constraining, rigid
standard of proof sufficiency in its criminal procedure, and because
its administration of criminal justice remained decentralized and un-
professional. Torments, other than punitive, that could legitimately be
inflicted on defendants were aimed at compelling them to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea at arraignment.10 Tor-
ture was not inflicted for interrogative purposes.
II
I have three reservations about Langbein's interpretation of the
Continental experience. This triptych of interlocking reservations was
not conceived in a spirit of dismissal. It does not attempt to under-
mine Langbein's main thesis, but rather suggests a number of correc-
tions and qualifications to it, while attempting a rapprochement be-
tween Langbein's book and more conventional views.
The first reservation concerns the developments that Langbein calls
a "revolution" in the law of proof. There are a number of reasons
why Langbein's account, stressing the initial rigidity in the Roman-
canon law of evidence, appears prima facie suspect. Early Roman-
canon conceptions of judicial office accorded a great deal of weight
to the beliefs or "conscience" of the judge in resolving conflicts be-
tween equity and the rigidity of the law. In the early period one also
finds more opportunity for the judiciary to arrive at subjective con-
victions as to guilt than was true later. Decisions were not yet system-
atically rendered on the basis of a cold file, as later became the prac-
8. The book contains a short study of torture warrants from the registers of the Privy
Council covering the period from 1540 to 1640. See pp. 81-128. This study indicates that
the Privy Council used torture primarily to discover accomplices and to prevent future
sedition. Those who dislike history on a grand scale will find Langbein's little study
among the most rewarding pages of his monograph.
9. P. 137.
10. This was the ill-famed peine forte et dure.
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tice; judges still interacted with defendants and witnesses." It is also
true that the later Middle Ages evinced an unusually strong desire to
repress and punish crime. The maxim ne crimina maneat impunita
(lest crime go unpunished) frequently sealed arguments. One would
thus expect that, from the beginning of the Roman-canon system, con-
viction with a sentence to a lesser punishment would have been a nat-
ural solution for the situation where "conscience" told the judge that he
must punish, while the rigidity of the law did not authorize the legal
punishment.
Even before the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when Langbein
believes the "evidentiary revolution" occurred, contemporary scholarly
writings show that nonafflictive punishments did serve this purpose.
These writings were much more than the theoretical musings of shel-
tered academics. The opinions of some scholars-including the ones
considered here-may be likened without exaggeration to high court
decisions in terms of their weight and influence on the life of the law.
There were even occasional statutory directions to this effect. The
relevant passages in the medieval literature are those dealing with "in-
dicia" or with "presumptions." Indicia are facts not directly relevant
to legal issues but of inferential value for the ascertainment of relevant
facts.
Analyzing indicia, the thirteenth-century writer Gandinus, for in-
stance, rejected the view, shared by some of his scholarly contempo-
raries, that those indicia possessing persuasive force (indicia indubitata)
sufficed for the imposition of capital punishment. In his view, how-
ever, such indicia did suffice for a sentence to a milder punishment,
"because crimes must not remain unpunished" (quia maleficia non
debent remanere impunita).'2 In the next century, passages permitting
11. For civil procedure, see R. VAN CAENEGEM, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN CIVIL PRO-
cEDuP (16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 17 [undated]). On the prob-
lem of judicial office, see, e.g., N. HORN, AEQUITAS IN DEN LEHREN DES BALDUS 112, 134-44
(1968).
As far as proceedings before ecclesiastical courts are concerned (and the latter possessed
wide jurisdiction in secular causes), one must bear in mind that the Church was initially
opposed to judicial torture. Torture was permitted only as of the mid-thirteenth century
as an instrument of obtaining confessions before special courts prosecuting heresy.
12. See A. GANDINUS, TRACTATUS DE MIALEFICIIS, as edited in 2 H. KANTOROWIcz, AL-
BERTUS GANDINUS UND DAS STRAFRECHT DER SCHOLASTIK 94, 176, 288 (1926). Conclusive in-
dicia (indicia indubitata) "are so compelling to the conscience of the judge that he be-
lieves them." See P. FARINACIUS, PROsPERI FARINACII RESPONSA CRIMINALIA (Liber 2, Con-
silium 108) 22 (A. Ciaconi ed., Rome 1615). At another place in his book, Gandinus offers
the example of a decisi6n from Parma where a defendant, accused of homicide, could not
be convicted on full proof. Upon the advice of "learned lawyers," a frequent practice in
Italy of the time, he was nevertheless not acquitted but fined. See A. GANDINUS, supra at
288. In the seventeenth century the German authority Benedict Carpzov invoked Gan-
dinus's authority for the imposition of poena extraordinaria. See B. CARPZOV, PRACrICA
866
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judges to convict on conclusive indicia can be found in the writings
of the famous Bartolus and of his student Baldus de Ubaldis, probably
the most penetrating scholar of the law of Roman-canon proof.13 In
the fifteenth century, the ill-famed Malleus Maleficarum, a how-to-do-
it book for the prosecution of witchcraft, advocated the use of punish-
ment milder than death on less than full proof of sorcery.' 4 Ironically,
it is only in the sixteenth century-the era of Langbein's "evidentiary
revolution"-that one sporadically encounters signs of hardening de-
mands for full proof, with the accompanying insistence that there be
acquittal unless the legal standards are met. An example of such rigidi-
ty is the famous Carolina of 1532, Emperor Charles V's codification of
criminal law and procedure for his domains. It may well be doubted,
however, that sixteenth-century judges treated such provisions in royal
ordinances as a nineteenth-century Continental judge approached a
legislative text. It should be no wonder, for example, that almost im-
mediately after the Carolina, the practice in German countries shows
ample signs that the poena extraordinaria was used in the absence of
the required Roman-canon proof.15
NOVA IMPERIALIS SAXONICA RERUM CRIMINALIUM (Pars 1, qu. 15, no. 50) 71 (B. Wust ed.,
Frankfurt 1677).
Gandinus is not the only great thirteenth-century authority to have displayed a "flex-
ible" attitude toward full Roman-canon proof. The somewhat older Durantis also would
have permitted criminal convictions, short of full proof, on "presumptions." See G. Du-
RANTIS, SPECULUM IURIS GULIELMI DURANDI (Pars 2, partic. 2, rubrica: De praesumptionibus,
no. 6) 742 (G. Bindoni ed., Venice 1576).
13. See I3ARTOLUS, CONSILIA, QUESTIONES r TRACTATUS BARTOLI A SAXOFERRATO (Tracta-
tus de Questionibus) 500 (Basel 1588). It is significant that when a sixteenth- or seven-
teenth-century Italian authority suggests the application of poena extraordinaria, he cites
back, as a rule, to Bartolus and Baldus for support. See, e.g., P. FARINACIUS, supra note
12, (Liber 2, Consilium 108) at 24. See also J. L~vY, LA HiERARCHIE DES PREUVES DANS LE
DROIT SAVANT DU MOYEN-AGE 123 (1939).
14. MALLEUS MALEFICARUM (Pars 3, qu. 25) 247 (M. Summers trans. 1971). For a num-
ber of lesser fifteenth-century authorities, see 2 P. FORELLI, LA TORTURA GIUDIZIARIA 27
n.18 (1954). At the transition into the sixteenth century, the continuity of the treatment
of indicia indubitata, reaching back to Gandinus, is crystal clear in HIPPOLYTUS DE MAR-
sIts, TRAcrATS DE QUaSTIONIBUS, folio 113 verso, no. 14, folio 114 recto, no. 17 (A. Vincent
ed., Lyons 1542).
15. For a good essay on the limited binding nature of the Carolina in various German
political units, see S. SCHMIDT, STELLUNG UND BEDEUTUNG DER CAROLINA IN GEMEINEN RECHT
30-33 (1938), cited in Sax, Zur Anwendbarkeit des Satzes "In dubio pro reo" im straf-
prozessualen Bereich: Eine historisch-dogmatische Untersuchung, in STUDIEN ZUR STRAF-
RECHTSWISSENSCHAnT 151 n.7 (G. Spendel ed. 1966). The seventeenth-century authority
Carpzov advocates poena extraordinaria, but under conditions more restrictive than the
contemporaneous French practice. If the defendant withstands torture without confessing,
he must be acquitted, unless new indicia appear. There is no mention in his work of the
French practice of "reserving indicia" so that torture does not "purge" them. See, e.g.,
B. CARPZOV, supra note 12, (Pars 3, qu. 116, no. 49) at 149.
Until quite recently, the view prevailed that poena extraordinaria was imposed on de-
fendants when judges only suspected but were not persuaded that the defendants were
guilty. Modern research has amply shown that this view rested on a terminological con-
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If, as these sources suggest, the possibility of imposing a milder pun-
ishment for serious crime on less than full proof existed from the in-
ception of the Roman-canon system, what does this do to Langbein's
thesis? It is not as damaging as might appear on first inspection. Despite
early acceptance of the idea of milder punishment, Langbein could
argue that the practice first came into its own and drastically expanded
in the sixteenth century. And, as the phenomenon is not susceptible of
exact statistical inquiry, one can argue endlessly how many swallows
we have to see before saying that spring has come. In the absence of
statistics, I believe it quite plausible that there was a significant ex-
pansion of poena extraordinaria in the sixteenth century.
The question then becomes how to account for this sudden change.
Is it attributable to a mutation of the internal evidentiary structure-
Langbein's "evidentiary revolution"? I think Langbein would himself
agree that the explanation should be sought in penology. In the for-
mative years of the Roman-canon system, only the blood sanction was
regarded by secular courts as the proper punishment for all serious
crime. Perhaps it is not too much of an exaggeration if one says that
only death and mutilation were regarded as criminal punishments in
the strict sense of the word. Where a thirteenth-century judge was
forced to fine or banish a criminal he thought guilty of murder, the
judge and his contemporaries would hardly have considered the de-
fendant to have suffered criminal punishment. It was only in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries that, in some Western countries,
various forms of penal servitude, usually "garnished" with flogging,
began to appear as an acceptable or preferable alternative to the blood
sanction in many cases of serious crime. 16 Put differently, it is in this
fusion. Terms such as "suspicion" referred in the old sources to lack of certainty under
the objective proof theory, rather than to the subjective suspicion of the judge. Langbein
espouses the modern view that poena extraordinaria was imposed in situations of incom-
plete proof where judges were persuaded of the defendant's guilt.
I believe, however, that one idealizes the repressive inquisitorial procedure if one states
that judges imposed a poena extraordinaria only when they were persuaded of guilt. That
the residuum of uncertainty should be resolved to the benefit of the defendant is the
product of more modern thinking on the relationship of the individual to the state. It
seems to me more likely that cases of poena extraordinaria embraced not only situations
where judges were fully persuaded, but also instances where guilt appeared only probable
to the judges. Inquisitorial judges quite clearly distinguished between the irreparability
of blood sanctions and milder modes of punishment. In the jargon of modern decision
theory, acceptable error margins depended on the magnitude of punishment. Besides,
where judges considered a defendant dangerous, but were not too sure he perpetrated
the crime sub judice, it would once again be unrealistic to assume that conviction and
sentence to poena extraordinaria required persuasion as to guilt.
16. In discussing extraordinary punishments for serious crime, Langbein leaves the
impression that only punishments entailing deprivation of freedom with forced labor
were involved. At least in the Habsburg territories, criminal punishment and infliction
Vol. 87: 860, 1978
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period that the range of applicability of the death penalty began to
shrink.
These developments are either discussed or strongly implied in Lang-
bein's book. Ultimately, then, my first reservation concerns solely the
author's characterization of these events. The law of evidence did not
change; modes of punishment did. If one wishes to use dramatic lan-
guage and speak of legal revolutions, there was a revolution in sub-
stantive criminal law and not in the law of proof.
My second reservation concerns Langbein's dismissing as a "fairy
tale" the conventional views on the watershed between Roman-canon
legal proof and free evaluation of evidence. The orthodoxy claims that,
in most countries, legal proof survived the abolition of torture for al-
most a century. Langbein, on the other hand, maintains that the spread
of the poena extraordinaria delivered a mortal blow to Roman-canon
legal proof at the same time that it made torture unnecessary.
According to the conventional view, the crucial test for the separa-
tion of legal proof from free evaluation of evidence lies in whether or
not the law attempts to regulate factfinding by assessing a priori the
weight of informational sources. The Roman-canon system was formed
in the golden age of scholastic philosophy, with its preoccupation with
logic and deduction. The system's founders believed that a hierarchy
could be worked out, through a combination of rational observation
and deduction, that would rank informational sources according to
their aprioristic cogency. At the top of the hierarchy they placed the
judge's own perception of relevant facts.17 Next in rank came certain
types of direct evidence.18 Here, the defendant's confession held a spe-
of physical pain continued inseparably well into the eighteenth century. In abolishing
torture in Croatia in 1776, Maria Theresa realized that the absence of torture would
reduce the range of the death penalty. She therefore treated penal servitude as a sub-
stitute and ordered that it be accompanied by periodic flogging "so that criminals ex-
perience that such public works are actually punishment." See the essay, based on archival
studies, by Bayer, Kazna batina u kontinentalnoj Hrvatskoj, 23 ZBORNIK PRAVNOG FAKUL-
TETA u ZAGREBU 41 n.39 (1973) (punishment of flogging in continental Croatia).
I will later indicate how closely the blood sanction was associated with the criminal
law. See pp. 874-75 infra. This link is reflected in etymology. For centuries continental
European law referred to criminal jurisdiction as "jurisdictio sanguinis" (jurisdiction of
blood) or "jus gladii" (law of the sword). Criminal courts in Germany were frequently
called "Halsgerichte" ("noose courts"), and the Russian expression for criminal law is ugo-
lovnoe pravo (capital law) even in modern Russian.
17. Strictly speaking, no evidence was needed here, because observation established
perfecta scientia (perfect knowledge) or notorium facti (notice of fact). See the lucid ob-
servations of Baldus de Ubaldis in J. LEvy, supra note 13, at 44.
18. There are many reasons for the preference of direct over circumstantial evidence
in the legal proof theory. What must especially be emphasized, however, is that there was
little understanding that all perception is inferential and that the distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence is one of degree only.
The importance of confessions was increased because the substantive criminal law of
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cial place; it constituted a link between judicial perception of fact
and other direct proof. At the bottom was circumstantial evidence (in-
dicia). 19 This hierarchy applied to civil and criminal cases alike. The
standards of sufficient evidence differed, however, for the two branches
of adjudication, with internal subdivisions, so dear to the scholastics,
within each branch. This was only the scaffolding. Within it detailed
rules were established that regulated weight and admissibility of evi-
dentiary items and constrained judicial discretion in factfinding.
The degree of rigidity in such a system depends significantly upon
whether evidence is weighed directly or on the basis of a cold file. De-
meanor evidence introduces the messy welter of life and resists regu-
lation. With the elimination of demeanor evidence, other direct proof
assumes great force, and the whole process of evaluating evidence, re-
moved from emotional involvements of the interrogation process, be-
comes a logical enterprise for which rules may be fashioned. Legal
proof, in the traditional view, is not automatically abandoned if, in
certain situations and for certain decisions, judges are authorized to
decide on circumstantial evidence alone. For the legal system may con-
tinue to constrain messy spontaneity and to regulate the weighing of
evidence. The weight and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence can
themselves be subject to more or less detailed regulation. Moreover,
since indicia too must be proven, the law may continue to require that
facts of inferential value be established by two eyewitnesses. And if
the evaluation of evidence continues to exclude the witnesses' demea-
nor by concentrating on the cold file, legal proof may still reign.
Langbein has a different understanding of "legal proof." He does
not explicitly define his concepts, but their contours can easily be ex-
trapolated from a number of passages in his book. For him, the sum
and substance of the Roman-canon system is the demand that there
be no conviction for serious crime without the defendant's courtroom
confession or the testimony of two eyewitnesses. In other words, full
proof for serious crime and the Roman-canon system of legal proof
are coterminous. Where, as with minor crime, a judgment may be pred-
icated on circumstantial evidence, the evidentiary system is one of
the time required an "internal" or subjective element of crime (premeditation, motive,
etc.). For such "internal" facts the defendant's confession remained the only direct evi-
dence. The move on the part of Continental law away from ritual and oracles, which
was stronger than in England, was accompanied by a greater emphasis on ethical mo-
tivation. This Durkheimian hypothesis could profitably be explored by studying the im-
pact of the church confessional literature on profane law.
19. Indicia had themselves to be proven by two eyewitnesses. See P. FARINACIUS, supra
note 12, (Liber 2, Consilium 138, no. 29) at 168.
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free evaluation.20 I think that Langbein's understanding rests on the
realization that the cogency of circumstantial evidence may never be
regulated exhaustively and that a large measure of judicial freedom
in this area is unavoidable. Where, however, a judgment must be based
solely on direct evidence, especially if the decision is mediated by the
file, the room for judicial discretion is significantly more circum-
scribed. Centering on this significant point along a continuum from
air-tight legal regulation to complete freedom in evaluating evidence,
Langbein regards the possibility of deciding on mere circumstantial
evidence as the dividing line between legal and free evidentiary sys-
tems. This view is tenable and may be fruitful in the analysis of evi-
dentiary systems. But it is idiosyncratic and obviously narrower than
conventional teaching. According to conventional views, Langbein is
plainly wrong. His conception would lead to the conclusion that Ro-
man-canon law never applied in civil procedure 2' or for minor crimes,
since full proof was unnecessary. Full proof, conventional scholarship
would argue, is only one part in the elaborate structure of the Roman-
canon law of evidence.
As a test of Langbein's idea that Roman-canon legal proof and tor-
ture died together, the situation in the German countries after the
abolition of torture deserves closer scrutiny. Even a cursory look at
the law of evidence reveals that the old hierarchy of proof did not
collapse: the preference for direct proof remained enshrined in statu-
tory provisions prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, and
sometimes even the imposition of long prison terms, on less than full
Roman-canon proof. The caution in regard to circumstantial evidence
continued to be reflected in provisions requiring automatic review by
a higher court of all judgments based on indicia.2 2 Legislation con-
tinued to prescribe what kind of circumstantial evidence was legally
sufficient for conviction. True, legal provisions did not mandate con-
viction when a certain quantum of indicia had been assembled, but
20. Pp. 10, 49. The author tells us, for instance, that the Roman-canon system is "un-
workable" without torture. P. 11.
21. A civil judgment could always rest on indicia alone. In contrast to criminal cases,
in civil litigation the judge was permitted to reach the required full proof by adding
proof fractions. One eyewitness was half proof, for instance, and one would add docu-
ments and the like until one reached full proof. See, e.g., G. DURANnS, supra note 12,
(Pars 2, partic. 2, rubrica: De presumptionibus, no. 2). Although this arithmetic was ex-
tensively regulated, it left much room for judicial discretion. For a conventional view that
legal proof continued in nineteenth-century civil procedure, see, e.g., I M. CAPPELLETrL
LA TESTMONIANZA DELLA PARTE NEL SISTEMA DELL' ORALITX 137 n.16 (1962).
22. For felonies, see, for example, the Austrian Penal Code of 1803. 17 SAMMLUNG DFE
GESErZE (First Part) § 435(a), at 513 (J. Kropatchek ed., Vienna [no date]). For minor
crimes, see id., (Second Part) § 400, at 663.
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the law frequently prohibited conviction in the absence of specific cir-
cumstantial evidence.23 Finally, evidence as reflected in demeanor was
not assessed: decisionmakers saw neither the witnesses nor the defen-
dant. They assessed testimony, sometimes in summary form, as it ap-
peared in the file. It must be admitted that this system permitted a great
deal of judicial discretion. But in some instances a legal provision would
preclude the possibility of conviction, no matter what the subjective
persuasion of the judges. At least, this is what contemporaries thought.
Some found these constraints desirable; others fought them, wishing
for the French system of conviction intime, which allowed the judge
or jury to convict upon subjective persuasion.2 4 I do not think that
Langbein would argue that German lawyers-for more than fifty years
after the abolition of torture-were plainly quixotic and fought imag-
inary battles. But he could maintain that free evaluation of evidence
won its decisive battle in the seventeenth century and that nineteenth-
century lawyers, who were involved only in mopping up operations to
remove minor constraints on their freedom, were overly impressed by
the importance of ongoing hostilities. Their ignorance that they were
actually operating under a system of conviction intime25 Langbein
could liken to that of Molitre's Bourgeois Gentilhomme, who failed to
realize he was always talking in prose.
In short, my second reservation suggests that Langbein underesti-
mates the constraints on free evaluation of evidence remaining in the
nineteenth-century inquisitorial process, much as my first reservation
was that he overestimates the rigidity in the early Continental law of
proof. And there is an independent critical point. The author should
have made it clear that his idea on what is legal as opposed to "free"
proof is novel and that the words used by him and by conventional
writers are only homonyms. By making clear this definitional dif-
ference, he could have provided a firm basis for mounting an attack
23. For an analysis of such provisions by a contemporary, see C. InTERMAIER, DiE
LEHRE VOM BEWEISE 450-58 (1834).
24. In the absence of the jury, Mittermaier seems to have favored a sort of mild legal
regulation of the weight of evidence. See id. at 84-94.
25. I hope it is not merely a pedantic cavil if I express a regret that Langbein's ap-
proach lumps together the French conviction intime, as reflected in a jury verdict, and
the evaluation of evidence by early nineteenth-century German judges on the basis of a
"blush-proof" dossier. One system relies on the direct evaluation of evidence, thus in-
cluding demeanor; the other is "mediate," and centers on logical cogency of statements.
Factfinding in one need not be explained and is recalcitrant to review. In the other it
must be explained and is reviewed by higher courts. Where the system of the blush-proof
dossier obtains, case law usually develops low visibility rules regarding evidentiary ques-
tions, including those about the cogency of evidence. For a similar view on the relation-
ship of immediacy and free evaluation, see M. CAPPELLETTI, supra note 21, at 109.
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on conventional theory. Langbein could have complained, for instance,
that the accepted definitions are too formalistic: they focus on the law-
giver's intention to constrain judicial freedom in evaluating evidence,
rather than on the actual judicial freedom in the performance of this
activity.
There is yet a third aspect of Langbein's central thesis that must be
taken, I believe, with a grain of salt. It is his position that, in the wake
of the poena extraordinaria revolution, Continental criminal pro-
cedure liberated itself from its dependence on confessions and that, in
consequence, judicial torture lost its raison d'etre.26 This, no doubt,
is another statement designed to stir the sediments of conventional
thinking. But before I examine it, I must quickly review four senses
in which one can claim that judicial torture had a raison d'etre in the
inquisitorial process.
The first assumes that Roman-canon legal proof was so rigid as to
preclude conviction in the absence of the testimony of two eyewitnesses
or a courtroom confession. If such a rigidity existed, the defendant's
confession would be practically a sine qua non of conviction, and ju-
dicial torture would be required to extract it. In the second sense, tor-
ture was needed to force the defendant to confess so that the blood
sanction could be applied. In both situations a judge could be fully
persuaded of the defendant's guilt. Still, confessions would be required,
either as a sine qua non of conviction or of the death penalty. Accord-
ingly, in both situations the use of judicial torture was logically linked
to legal proof and to the discrepancy between a required objective
proof standard and the judge's subjective evaluation.
The next sense in which judicial torture was needed is logically in-
dependent of legal proof. Assume that the judge only suspected the
defendant's guilt without being fully persuaded. Here the judge would
desire a confession as a vehicle for transforming his subjective state of
uncertainty into persuasion as to guilt, while at the same time securing
the legally required mode of proof. Even if there were no legal proof
in inquisitorial procedure, confessions would still be valued in this
situation, and coercive measures would be used to obtain them. The
fourth and last sense in which torture had a raison d'etre is also inde-
pendent of legal proof, whether in the traditional or Langbein's vari-
ant, but is linked to the deeper, underlying issue of judicial interroga-
tion of defendants in the inquisitorial process. The explicit or implied
threat to order torture was used as a back-up mechanism to sustain
26. See, e.g., pp. 12, 59.
873
HeinOnline -- 87 Yale L.J. 873 1977-1978
The Yale Law Journal
the coercive atmosphere during interrogations, an atmosphere thought
necessary to produce the desired self-incrimination.
Returning now to Langbein's thesis, one can easily see why he reaches
his strange conclusion that, in the wake of the poena extraordinaria
expansion, the inquisitorial process was liberated from its reliance on
confessions and torture was no longer needed. With his myopic focus
on the demanding proof standard and with his conception of its rigidi-
ty, he perceives nothing but the first sense in which one can say that
judicial torture is needed. Before his evidentiary revolution, the propo-
sition "no confession, no conviction" was true. After the revolution, the
confession ceased to be a sine qua non of conviction, and in this sense
the procedure was liberated from the need for judicial torture.
But what about the additional senses? After the advent of the new
forms of punishment, the need to extract confessions disappeared only
where judges managed to persuade themselves that the defendant was
guilty on evidence other than his confession, and the crime involved
was such that a penalty short of death appeared acceptable or even pref-
erable to the old blood sanction.2 7 But in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the poena extraordinaria did not always satisfy the urge to
punish. The strong desire to impose the death penalty, even aggravated
by torture, continued to flourish for quite a number of crimes. Magic
and witchcraft spring to mind most readily as dramatic examples.
2 s
But the almost hysterical urge to impose the punishment of death was
not limited to demoniac offenses. Many types of homicide, treason, and
some transgressions of the sexual code continued to be viewed as
crimina atrocissima, crimes so heinous that death was the only appro-
27. Where the substantive law considers, for instance, imprisonment to be the appro-
priate punishment, judicial torture, as a procedural measure inflicted on the guilty and
the innocent indiscriminately, is vulnerable to the objection that the procedural measure
is disproportionate in its harshness to the punishment imposed on the convict. From its
inception the Roman-canon proof theory was sensitive to this objection. This is why
torture was not permitted for minor crimes.
28. The seventeenth century was the era of the great prosecutions for magic and
witchcraft. As a good illustration of the temper of the times one can take a frightening
little book by a French judge, H. BOGuET, DISCOURS DES SORCIERS (I. Pillehotte ed., Lyon
1603). In the dedication the judge offers figures about the number of witches in France
(at least 30,000) and boasts about his experiences in putting them to death. He recognizes
the practice of imposing a milder punishment upon defendants convicted on conjectures
indubitables. But if witchcraft is involved, he expresses his readiness to depart from the
majority view, which would not apply capital punishment on less than full proof. He
advises that witches and sorcerers still be put to death, but only be spared burning on
the stake. The judge must devise "[une] mort ...plus douce"! Id. at 251.
Late in the eighteenth century the Austrian Emperess Maria Theresa was still agonizing
over what to do with witchcraft prosecutions. She never really abolished the crime, but
only surrounded prosecutions with great safeguards and restrictions. See V. BAYER, UcovoR
S DJAVLOM 302-13 (2d ed. 1969) (contract with devil).
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priate punishment. Because of this attitude it would have been vain
to try to persuade judges of the period, such as Boguet in France or
Carpzov in Saxony, that a defendant accused of such a crime should
not be put to torture because of the alternative opened by milder
punishments.
29
The perceived need for torture survived the penological revolution
also in all those cases where, having assembled enough evidence for
the interlocutory decree, the judge was not sure whether the defendant
had committed the crime. It would be erroneous to think that the
subjective persuasion of guilt was a prerequisite to judicial torture.
Although it may have been the case with defendants belonging to the
social elite or as to the most extreme torments, it is clearly false as a
general proposition.
30
Perhaps most important, torture continued to play an important
role in connection with the interrogation process. From the inception
of the inquisitorial procedure, the examination of the suspect was con-
sidered to be the principal mechanism for discovering truth. The sus-
pect was legally bound to answer truthfully and unambiguously the
questions asked of him.31 The violation of these legal duties consti-
tuted one of the indicia required for the interlocutory order to apply
torture. It is frequently overlooked, however, that this was not the
only sanction to induce self-incrimination. There existed a special kind
of torture used not only in the unlikely case that a suspect refused to
talk, but also when he was caught in contradictions or pretended-in
the opinion of the examiner-that he did not remember or know the
answer. "This sort of torture," said the seventeenth-century judge Carp-
zov, making one of his slippery distinctions, "is imposed not so much
29. Except for cases of witchcraft, see note 28 suin'a, it would also have been difficult
to persuade these judges that mere circumstantial evidence sufficed for the irrevocable
death penalty. This Langbein seems to recognize. See p. 177 n.18.
30. Although conviction and sentence to a milder punishment could occur on indicia
indubitata, less compelling indicia sufficed for torture, provided that a local statute did
not stipulate otherwise. See BARTOLUS, supra note 13, at 500; I. CLARUS, IULII CLARI OPERA
OMNIA (Liber 5 (Practica Criminalis), qu. 20, nos. 4-5) 446 (Bailly pub., Lungduni 1672).
According to Carpzov, persuasion of guilt was necessary only for imposing the most serious
degree of torture-the rack, aggravated by torments with a flaming torch. B. CARPZOV,
supra note 12, (Pars 3, qu. 177, no. 65) at 158. Some opponents of torture in the eighteenth
century tried to limit its applications to cases where the judge was fully persuaded as to
guilt, but wanted to impose the ordinary punishment. M. BODO, JURISPRUDENTA CRIMINALIS
SECUNDUM PRAXIM rr CONSTITUTIONEs HUNGARICAS (Pars 1, art. 29, § 3) 68 (Posonii 1751).
31. Sometimes, as in the Italian practice reported by Clarus, the defendant would have
to take an oath to speak the truth before the examination began. Usually, however, the
practice of requiring an oath was not followed, on the ground that it led to perjury.
See I. CLARus, supra note 30, (Liber 5, qu. 45, no. 9) at 551.
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in order to discover the truth as to extract an answer."32 It does not
take a great deal of imagination to realize how helpless inquisitorial
judges would have felt at interrogations if these coercive measures had
been taken away from them.
In light of all these various uses of judicial torture in inquisitorial
procedure, Langbein's criticism of French abolitionist writing seems
unjustified. He takes the publicists to task for failing to demonstrate
the workability of the criminal process without torture. The clincher,
in Langbein's opinion, should have been the argument that confes-
sions were no longer essential because criminals could be punished on
evidence short of full proof.33 Were the royal entourage and the judi-
cial establishment not aware of this possibility without the Enlighten-
ment propaganda efforts? If one asks what pragmatic arguments would
have fallen on more receptive ears among those responsible for criminal
law enforcement, the following argument would probably do: "We
realize that the system needs coercive measures to make defendants
talk. But there is no reason why it should hold onto the archaic and
barbarous ways of inflicting physical pain. The coercive atmosphere
can be achieved by subtler, more civilized methods, methods less dis-
proportionate than judicial torture to the milder character of most
modem punishments." Had the publicists argued this way, they would
have anticipated the developments in Continental inquisitorial pro-
cedure following the abolition of torture. I think it can hardly be dis-
puted that the abolition did produce difficulties for law enforcers.
34
But soon milder coercive devices designed to produce self-incrimination
32. "Quae tortura imponitur, non tam ad veritatem eruendam, quam ad extorquen-
dam responsionem." B. CARPZOV, supra note 12, (Pars 3, qu. 113, nos. 56, 57) at 126. An
almost identical passage appears in Clarus, who praises the effectiveness of this torture
on the basis of his practical experiences. 1. CLARUS, supra note 30, (Liber 5, qu. 45, no.
6) at 550. For detailed instructions on the application of this form of torture, see I.
FRiLICH, NEMEsIS ROMANO: AUSTRIACO: TYROLENSIS (Buch I, tit. 2, no. 1-4; Buch III, tit.
5, no. 8) 97-99, 182 (J. Wagner ed., Innsbruck 1696). Much later Beccaria, though an
enemy of judicial torture, would believe in "punishment . . . of the severest kind" for
obstinate refusals of the defendant to answer questions during his interrogation. C. BEc-
CARTA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 150 (London 1801). As we shall see, the
nineteenth-century poenae inobedientiae bear a not so strange resemblance to this tortura
ad extorquendam responsionem.
33. See p. 67.
34. Langbein apparently thinks this to be part of the "fairy tale." See p. 10. Let me
offer two illustrations in support of the statement in the text. After the Swiss cantons
in 1803 obtained the power to regulate their own criminal procedures, they quickly re-
introduced torture. See Pfenninger, Die Wahrheitspflicht des Beschuldigten im schwei-
zerischen Strafuerahren, 53 SCHWEIZERuSCnE JURISTEN ZEITVNC, 130, 133-34 (1957). Or con-
sider the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Although Maria Theresa abolished torture in 1776,
monarchs were repeatedly forced to ban torture in some parts of their lands until 1818,
for torture continued to be applied in practice. As we shall later see, this was especially
true of lands where the estates and nobility successfully opposed absolutism.
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appeared on the scene, and the chase for confessions continued, only
in ways less brutal though sometimes more perfidious.
3 5
If my criticism of Langbein's view on the need for confession and
the raison d'etre for torture were accepted, how would this affect his
thesis? His strong claim that torture had lost its purpose would have
to be weakened. The perceived need for confessions and thus for tor-
ture had decreased but had not been eliminated. It had decreased in
equal proportion to the shrinking of the number of crimes for which
capital punishment continued to be viewed as the only proper sanc-
tion.30 And, in fairness to the author, I must admit that, in the majority
of Western European countries, the decrease seems to have been quite
substantial. To have brought out the subterranean connections be-
tween the decline of the old "blood sanction" and the eclipse of judi-
cial torture remains Langbein's significant contribution to the litera-
ture on the subject.
35. The example of the Austrian system under the Penal Code of 1803 is as telling
as it is representative. After torture was abolished, no matter how incredible it may seem,
the defendant was denied a number of rights he enjoyed under the older variant of the
inquisitorial process. He lost the right to inspect the dossier, and provisions on pre-
liminary detention were made stricter so as to enable the investigating judge to hold
the defendant incommunicado. This practice was widespread in Europe. See Waiblinger,
La protection de la libertd individuelle dans l'instruction, 24 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENAL 225, 250-52 (1953). In contrast to prior practice, the investigating judge was
now authorized not to reveal to the defendant the exact charge against him. See SAMMLUNG
DER GESETZE, supra note 22, § 292, at 462. The idea of the provisions was quite clear. By
playing one's cards close to the vest, one hoped to exploit the nervous state of the guilty
defendant's mind and his uncertainty about how much his interrogators already knew,
possibly persuading him that his persistent denials of guilt were useless. Besides, with a
vague idea of how much was really known, the guilty defendant found it harder to in-
vent a plausible but false story. Of course, skimpy information about charges prevented
the innocent defendant, also languishing in detention, from an early successful defense.
But this prospect was not disturbing in the absolutist police states of the era.
At the same time, various disciplinary punishments for improper behavior at interro-
gations came into vogue, reminiscent of the old torture "to extract answers." At the be-
ginning of the examination the defendant would be warned by the judge that his failure
to speak (and confess if guilty) would result not only in increased punishment, but also
in special penalties for "disobedience," frequently consisting of flogging. Inconsistencies
in the defendant's answers were also a ground for such disciplinary penalties. The German
legal philosopher Gustav Radbruch was not exaggerating when he remarked that the
difference between the abolished torture and the new "punishments for disobedience"
was largely one of rationalization: the mistreated defendant was told that he was being
beaten "not in order to tell the truth, but because he has told a lie." G. RADBRUCH, EIN-
FrinRUNG IN DIE REmnTSWISSENSCHAFT 187 (K. Zweigert ed. 1964).
36. Linkages between judicial torture and the death penalty were clearly perceived by
contemporaries, and abolitionist strategies were mapped accordingly. Some abolitionists,
like Beccaria, criticized the death penalty. Others, like Maria Theresa, conceded that abo-
lition would decrease the range of application of capital punishment, but viewed various
forced labor schemes, accompanied by flogging, as an acceptable alternative. See note
16 supra. Finally, Frederick the Great of Prussia took yet another tack: he permitted im-
position of the death penalty on indicia alone, but his reform was quickly abolished in
subsequent legislation.
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But if Langbein's thesis is modified, a new problem is unveiled. As
long as the cessation of the evidentiary necessity for judicial torture
is thought to be the principal ground for its abolition, one is justified
in focusing solely on the epistemological aspects of the institution. The
"humanistic perspective," being less important, may safely be left out.
This, in fact, is what Langbein does. Discussing, for instance, the de-
fects of torture, he leaves moral problems aside and centers instead on
the efficiency of torture as a device for screening the guilty from the
innocent.37 Throughout his book he remains consistent and persists in
this self-imposed anesthesia of the heart. But, if I am right, and the
need for coerced confessions survived the penological changes, surely
the abandonment of judicial torture cannot be explained within Lang-
bein's narrow evidentiary perspective.
III
Judicial torture cannot properly be understood unless one realizes
that from the very beginning the "human cost" of its use did not pass
unnoticed. Like most other procedural institutions, judicial torture
was never evaluated exclusively in terms of its use in controlling crime.
Quite naturally, the human costs were assessed according to the moral
temper and ethical yardsticks of the epoch. I shall examine only one
aspect of the perceived human costs-exemptions based on social status-
since this factor helps to explain both the origin and abandonment
of judicial torture.
Insofar as the faded fresco of its origin can reliably be restored, ju-
dicial torture seems never to have been a generally permissible institu-
tion. In the thirteenth century, society was permeated by considera-
tions of rank and status that affected all social institutions, including
those of criminal procedure. Small wonder then to discover in the con-
temporary sources that the permissibility of torture depended greatly
on the social class of the defendant. Broadly speaking, one can state
that the thirteenth-century elites were not subject to torture, unless
involved in mutual struggles for power.38 In later developments it
37. See p. 861 & note 2 supra.
38. For classical feudal exemptions from torture, see the legislation promulgated in
1265 for Castile and Leon, one of the first medieval kingdoms to develop an estate system.
LAS SiErE PARTIDAS (Partida 7, tit. 30, ley 2) 1458 (trans. S. Scott 1931). Very similar ex-
emptions appear in scholarly works of the period and in collections of customary law.
See, e.g., E. VERB6CZY, TRIARTITUM JURIS CONSUETUDINARII INCLYTY REGNI HUNGARIAE (Pars
3, tit. 20) 519-20 (1775).
Italy is a special case, for-with the exception of Piedmont and Sicily-no political units
with an estate system developed. It is well known that quite a few doubt the feudal cre-
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would, however, be simplistic to assume that the defendant's station
in society affected only immunities from torture. The defendant's dig-
nity, the irreparable consequences of torture inflicted on an innocent,
and similar considerations were assessed in deciding not only whether
to torture the defendant at all but also for what offenses to torture and
how severe to make the torments.3 9 No matter how coarse and brutal
the epoch may seem to us, sensitivity to human suffering and even
moral refinement were not totally absent. What was missing, however,
was a general human empathy independent of social class, a universal
conception of human rights transcending status. Equality was still il-
legal. Therefore, although human suffering was taken into account in
regulating torture, this factor was weighed differently depending on the
station in society of the individual defendant.
40
The French developments are especially revealing of how human
costs affected the evolution of torture. As far as exemptions of nobility
dentials of Italy. Privileges of nobility were frequently not recognized by Italian city-states,
and instances are known where torture was used as a weapon in the persecution of
"magnates." See H. KANTOROWIZz, REcuTSHIsTORISCHE SCIRIFTEN 318 (1970). Even so, tor-
ture from the beginning was not a generally permissible instrument. "Persons placed in a
position of dignity" enjoyed exemptions from torture. See I. CLARUS, supra note 30, (Liber
5, qu. 64, no. 17) at 691.
39. A good example is at B. CARPZOV, supra note 12, (Pars 3, qu. 117, nos. 1-5) at 152-53.
In a surprisingly poetic moment, the author compares the irreparable damage done to
the tortured innocent to "lost virginity."
Soon after the inception of torture, immunities were no longer absolute. They did not
apply to treason, heresy, and similar serious offenses of the time, some of which we would
today term political. B. CARPZOV, supra note 12, (Pars 3, qu. 118, no. 87) at 167. Exemptions
were particularly strong in lands where nobility was powerful. For Poland, "the democracy
of noblemen," see 2 Z. KACZMARCZYK & B. LESNODORSKi, HISTORIA P/(NSTWA I PRAWA POLSKI
195, 207 (1957). For Hungary, see E. VERndCZY, supra note 38, (Pars 3, tit. 20) at 519-20.
Even if subject to torture, the privileged received less harsh treatment. Farinacius states
that, according to the "doctors," the last degree of torture must not "by any means" be ap-
plied to nobles. See P. FARINACIUS, supra note 12, (Liber 2, Consiliuln 175, No. 21) at 343.
Clarus indicates generally that "nobiles satis minus ...sunt torquandi." See I. CLARUS,
supra note 30, (Liber 5, qu. 64, no. 17) at 691 (marginal gloss). See B. CARZOV, supra note
12, (Pars 1, qu. 117, no. 71) at 159. Sometimes the sufficiency of indicia for torture would
depend on social status. See P. FARINACIUS, supra note 12, (Liber 2, Consilium 175, qu. 22)
at 343 (sufficiency of indicia for crime of forgery).
40. Langbein is too conscientious a student of history to overlook this body of law,
but he does not focus on it. He notes, in passing, only the most visible regulations, those
pertaining to status-based exemptions from torture. And, as he does not find them in
the Carolina, and because they had fallen into disfavor with the French writers of the
ancien rdginze, he does not attach particular importance to this aspect of the law of tor-
ture. P. 13. The French developments will be considered in the text that follows. See
pp. 880-81 infra. The absence from the Carolina of status-based immunities from torture
should not be taken to mean that the political units of Germany ceased to exempt the
privileged classes from torture. For a time noblemen could even claim to be exempted
from the inquisitorial process altogether and be treated according to the milder "accu-
satorial" procedure of the period. Status exemptions from torture, as well as privileges
as to the degree of torture when the latter was permissible, remained a matter of cus-
tomary law. That this body of law continued to live in the next century is witnessed by
Carpzov's authoritative work.
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from torture are concerned, in the mid-sixteenth century these privi-
leges were already in decline before French courts. As of the fifteenth
century, however, royal courts, staffed by persons of non-noble back-
ground, began to displace customary law and triumph over the com-
peting jurisdiction of feudal and ecclesiastical courts. The decline of
exemptions from torture was thus only part of a more general eclipse
of the privileges of hereditary nobility in the increasingly bureaucratic
and absolutist state.41 The social nature of absolutism and especially
the relationship of the state toward nobility are subject to a great deal
of dispute. But few would question that the absolutist state tried every-
where to break down feudal privileges or at least to move the locus of
privilege from feudal status to important functions in the state ap-
paratus and at court.42 It strived ultimately to create a single class of
subjects and a legal system of generally applicable norms.43 It never
totally succeeded and, although curtailed, status and privileges con-
tinued to play a role in social life generally and in criminal procedure
particularly. For a long time it remained only a remote practical pos-
sibility for a member of the upper strata to be prosecuted and sub-
jected to judicial torture. When this occurred, the crime involved was
usually of such a character that immunities from torture would not
have applied even under the "classic exemptions," and torture was post-
poned until after judges became convinced of guilt. Inevitably, any
such prosecution became a cause cdelbre.
44
41. The magistrates gradually turned into a hereditary nobility of their own (noblesse
de robe), and bitter animosities between them and the hereditary peers continued until
the end of the ancien rdgime. This is clearly illustrated in the memoirs of the Duc de
Saint-Simon. See 2 HISTORICAL MEMOIRS OF THE DUc DE SAINT-SIMON 367-71 (L. Norton
trans. 1968).
42. This shift, so dear to the judicial bureaucrats, may be observed in the writings of
Clarus, who is aware of developments in France. Speaking about the Continental ius
commune generally, he claims that exemptions based on occupancy of high office are
recognized everywhere. This was not so with the privileges of noblemen. In Clarus's view,
"real" nobles should enjoy immunities from torture. But who is really of noble descent?
"Nowadays," he writes, "the blossom of nobility has been corrupted by vile and unworthy
marriages, and hardly anywhere can one tell whether a person is really noble." I. CLARUS,
supra note 30, (Liber 5, qu. 64, no. 17) at 691. Ultimately, then, Clarus relegates the prob-
lem to the customs of the place where legal proceedings occur.
43. On this aspect of the absolutist state, see the perceptive passages in F. NEUMANN,
THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 181-83 (1957). In the criminal process,
this tendency required the separation of procedural roles from roles in society. Creating a
single class of subjects did not imply, in the criminal process, granting defendants pro-
cedural rights and safeguards against officials. In this respect monarchial and bourgeois
interests clashed. See generally M. WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
266-67 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1967).
44. For a flavor of cases involving hereditary nobility, see the seventeenth-century
prosecution of Mme. de Brinvillier, accused of parricide and fratricide through poisoning.
1 GAYOT DE PITAVAL, CAUSES CiLiBRES ET INTtESANTES 203 (J. Neaulme ed., The Hague,
1765). For a treason case (which would also have provided no exemption under classic
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But this was by no means the case with hoi polloi who were subject to
torture on much less evidence.45 As time went by, the process of cur-
tailment of feudal privileges by the absolutist state continued.46 With
the further blurring of social distinctions in the eighteenth century, the
elite came increasingly in contact with an instrument first designed for
lower orders. The chances that a noble would be caught by the in-
quisitorial procedural machine were no longer negligible. As torture
was about to become truly a general procedural technique, the per-
ceived human cost of the technique increased dramatically. The upper
strata could now more easily than before recognize themselves in the
tormented defendant. This identification process must be viewed
against the background of strong coeval currents in ideology. The idea
of universal human rights, gaining strength with the rise of the bour-
geoisie within the old order, ended up by contaminating substantial
segments of the nobility itself. As the decline of the old blood sanctions
affected the evidentiary status of judicial torture, diminishing its im-
portance, so the costs of torture in terms of recognized human suffering
increased. Sensibilities became more delicate. And considerations of
humanity, heretofore confined to some, had now to be given weight
with respect to all defendants. In consequence, torture appeared in-
creasingly as an "irrational institution," surely a strong indictment in
the Age of Reason.47 Its legitimacy was undermined even within the
absolutist state.
This brings us back to the role of the Enlightenment propaganda
for abolition. Langbein is right in pointing out that the publicists, by
law), see the prosecution of the Marquis de Cinq-Mars, in J. ImBERT, QUELQUES PROCkS
CRIMINELS DES XVII' Fr XVIII' SIkcLas 77-100 (1964). In such cases torture was ordered
after the judges had already persuaded themselves of the defendant's guilt, and torture
thus turned into a sort of punishment. The run-of-the-mill cases, in which torture was
used with more abandon, were viewed without much animadversion, as contemporary
literature attests.
45. The fact that less evidence was needed to apply torture to vagabonds is noted
by Langbein. P. 149 n.40.
46. Early in the eighteenth century, Saint-Simon compiled a long list of privileges
taken away from the aristocracy, and wondered whether, as a result, peasants and noble-
men could still be distinguished-surely an exaggeration of a frustrated aristocrat. See 2
SAINT-SIMON, supra note 41, at 450. Mirabeau and Beccaria both thought that formal
equality before the law did not contradict the true principles of the absolutist state. C.
BECCARIA, supra note 32, at 77-80. See H. JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD
53 (1973).
47. The idea that torture was unreasonable was partly due to the change in the
strength of religious beliefs as well. As religion lay very close below the surface of thir-
teenth-century institutions, it offered a rationalization for judicial torture. If a confession
"freely" repeated after torture could save a sinning defendant from eternal torments, was
it not "rational" to immerse him for a while in the absolving sea of pain? Unperturbed
by Pascal's wager, the Enlightenment period no longer had much sympathy for this kind
of rationalization.
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harping on ethical issues, mainly repeated old criticisms of torture.
Nor is it easy to imagine that the philosophes could have acted dif-
ferently. It is precisely their dizzying and exaggerated belief in the
possibility of ever-increasing civility that generated their creative af-
flatus. Assume that, as Langbein desires, they focused instead on
demonstrating the workability of the criminal justice system without
torture. As I have pointed out before, trying to persuade the law en-
forcers of the absolutist state that torture was no longer needed would
have called for much stronger pragmatic arguments than the one ad-
vanced by Langbein, that is, that torture was no longer necessary in
the narrow, evidentiary sense of a sine qua non of conviction.48 These
stronger arguments, however, would have required a substantial dose
of skepticism about the position of defendants in the procedure of the
"enlightened" future, a pessimism quite alien to the temper of the
publicists. They would hardly have argued that the state now had
subtler but still inhumane means of coercion.
Whether the propaganda of any of the great abolitionists influenced
the promulgation of the abolition decrees is open to conjecture. But
this is not to say that the propaganda was doomed to failure because
it focused on stirring a sense of moral scandal at the continuing use of
torture. Abolition was the work of enlightened despots. Although not
importantly constrained by pressures and concerns of judicial bureau-
cracy, they all displayed, in one form or another, uncertainty about
the practical impact of the abandonment of torture on the administra-
tion of criminal law. Surely, then, something beyond the pragmatic
needs of criminal procedure impelled them to act. In France the im-
petus may have been public opinion, which was imbued with the new
ideology and sensitive to the human suffering involved in torture. But
what about the monarchs of central and eastern Europe, where most
abolition decrees were passed? It has been suggested, and quite plau-
sibly I think, that rulers of central and eastern Europe were motivated
in their reforms by a great desire to impress the more advanced West,
whose culture they embraced as ardent "dilletantes. '49 If the abandon-
ment of judicial torture is considered such a reform, the publicists'
effort to maintain a vital sense of moral outrage at the continuing use
of torture may not have been such a bad policy after all.
The discussion of moral aspects of torture takes us away from Lang-
48. See p. 877 supra.
49. See P. ANDERSON, LINEAGES OF THE ABSOLUTIST STATE 233 (1974). Public opinion as
a pressure factor existed only in France. See THE WIDENING CIRCLE: ESSAYS ON TIlE CIRCU-
LATION OF LITERATURE IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EUROPE (P. Korshin ed. 1976).
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bein's focus, which lies on the crime-control aspects of the institution.
Returning to the pragmatic aspects, let me register a final note of
regret. Within his chosen, pragmatic field of vision, Langbein studies
the interlacings of judicial torture and legal proof in total isolation
from the larger, underlying problem of the defendant's interrogation
in the inquisitorial criminal process. Unless, in addition to these in-
terlacings, some attention is given to the deeper phenomenon of inter-
rogation, at least two precious perspectives are lost. First, torture does
not appear, as I think it should, as only an episode in the history of
coercive measures to assure the defendant's cooperation with law en-
forcement officials during interrogation. Its abolition seems a much
more momentous change than is warranted by actual developments.
Second, interesting linkages to modem methods of inducing defendants
to incriminate themselves are severed. Before I close, let me substantiate
these two claims.
If in the thirteenth century the demanding Roman-canon system of
legal proof had not developed, defendants in the inquisitorial type of
process would still have been required to answer questions truthfully.
And the authorities would still have desired to examine the defendant
under the coercive atmosphere thought to guarantee the reliability of
information. Given the climate of the times, does it not appear in-
evitable that torture for extracting answerso would also have re-
mained and have been used at least toward the lower orders? To use a
convenient Freudian term, judicial torture was overdetermined in late
medieval inquisitorial procedure. Once this is realized, the precise
form of such torture (tortura ad eruendam veritatem) to which Lang-
bein's book is devoted begins to fall into proper perspective as just one
weapon from the arsenal of coercive measures designed to compel self-
incrimination in the interrogation process. More important, its abo-
lition assumes a less dramatic character than might appear otherwise:
in essence, one coarse medieval form of coercion was replaced by less
cruel ones. And starting with disciplinary punishments for disobedi-
ence in interrogation, one can construct a continuum leading to con-
temporary nonadversary procedures that still contain, more or less dis-
guised, legitimate devices to induce self-incrimination and to discourage
silence at interrogations."l
50. See pp. 875-76 & note 32 supra. Langbein does not rule out the possibility that tor-
ture would have appeared in the period even in the absence of legal proof. P. 8. In fact
it was used in medieval Europe independently of such proof and for a long time in China
by the nonlegalistic mandarin bureaucracy.
51. I have examined only some of the devices that encourage loquacity in my article,
Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Compara-
HeinOnline -- 87 Yale L.J. 883 1977-1978
The Yale Law Journal
Had Langbein followed this connection, his provocative historical
juxtaposition of the common law and Continental systems would also
have assumed a clear contemporary relevance. The reader will recall
Langbein's emphasis on divergent standards of proof sufficiency in the
two legal cultures and on the different loci in which legitimate pres-
sure was applied on defendants.5 2 Both contrasts, I think, survive to
this day. While pressure is still brought to bear on Continental de-
fendants during their interrogation, it is applied against common law
defendants at the pleading stage. And although the Continental locus
of pressure is directly related to the desire to obtain information about
the out-of-court event, the common law plea bargain is less directly
related to the desire to establish the truth. I realize that the mono-
graphic method requires the narrowing of perspectives. But even a
slight attention by Langbein to the deeper problem of the defendant's
interrogation would have suggested connections between his theme
and our modern concerns and thus would have added significantly to
his interesting and provocative book.
tive Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 526-30 (1973). For an interesting new account, see
Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26
BUFFALO L. REV. 361, 377-81 (1977).
52. See, e.g., pp. 9, 77, 184 n.20.
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